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Societal trust and nation-thinking in the midst of a pandemic – Central Europe 
and Scandinavia 
 
Trust in those who lead the government, trust in the way society is ordered, and trust in other people can all 
influence how individuals perceive the country in which they live. This study examines the different facets of 
societal trust (the complex network of state, political, national and social trust) in four European countries – 
Norway, Sweden, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – and connects these with how people understand their 
society to be organized, especially the degree to which the national frame is relevant. The results presented 
from these four countries offer a more nuanced picture of what it means to have trust in government and 
institutions and what it means to have trust in those who inhabit one’s country, especially in a time of crisis. 
The main data sources are identical surveys in four languages.  
 
Introduction 
This study sets out to examine societal trust in relation to the salience of nationalism (nation-thinking) in two 
sets of European countries: Norway and Sweden with their reportedly high levels of accumulated social trust, 
and Slovakia and Czechia with their reportedly low levels of accumulated social trust. While questions about 
the salience of the nation are perennial in nature, questions about social trust and political trust have perhaps 
become even more prevalent during the COVID-19 pandemic. By examining these different facets of societal 
trust, one should be able to get a nuanced picture of the internal highs and lows when it comes to trust, and 
gain better understanding about the role that the nation and national differentiation play in societal trust. The 
data used to examine these relationships comes primarily from the results of a survey campaign in May and 
June 2000. 
As framed, this research attempts to accomplish a number of tasks. First, it seeks to examine some of the 
constitutive elements of societal trust in the four countries in question. Categorizing countries simply as high 
trust or low trust countries does not tell the whole story. In order to counter broad generalizations regarding 
social trust in Scandinavia and Central Europe, this analysis shows the internal highs and lows of societal trust, 
giving a more nuanced picture of who and what receives the trust of respondents. Trust in government might 
be low, but trust in strangers can be high. The inverse is also possible. However, even estimations such as this 
are not complete as trust for groups and institutions may also be highly contextual. In addition, the survey asks 
respondents to differentiate between various levels of societal organization: respondents evaluate their levels 
of trust and attachments along various geographic divisions such as local lines, regional lines, national lines 
and beyond. This research also delves into people’s perceptions of equality/inequality and 
diversity/homogeneity in their home countries and analyzes them in connection with respondents’ reliance on 
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the national frame. While I will not go into perceptions of equality and diversity in this article, some of the 
data from this section of the survey will be alluded to here. Lastly, I seek to situate all of this in the context of 
the pandemic situation in the late spring of 2020. 
As mentioned, two pairs of countries are examined here: Slovakia – Czechia and Sweden – Norway. The 
former exhibit low trust on a European level and the latter exhibit high trust on a European level. The countries 
have similar population sizes and comparative populations. Both pairs include one country with about 5.5 
million inhabitants (Slovakia, Norway) and both pairs include one country with a bit over 10 million inhabitants 
(Czechia, Sweden). There is a general perception that Norway and Sweden exhibit high levels of equality and 
that Czechia and Slovakia exhibit higher levels of inequality, although this is somewhat tampered by the 
decades under communism that flattened the inequality curve to a large degree. In addition, both pairs were 
single countries in relatively recent history, each with a dominant partner and a lesser partner. They exhibit 
similar dynamics of othering (big brother, little brother relationships) with Czechia and Sweden considered 
more cosmopolitan, and Norway and Slovakia more provincial/parochial. These relationships make each of 
the paired countries their most significant comparative other.  
In this article, I will first present the topic in focus: trust and the national frame. I will then share some of the 
survey responses that pertain to societal trust: trust ratings for groups and institutions, ratings of reliance on 
various groups and institutions and feelings of attachment to various social groupings. Following that, I will 
explore trust ratings specifically in the context of the pandemic. Lastly, the degree to which the national frame 
is salient for respondents will be examined in connection to trust ratings. 
 
Trust, distrust and the nation 
Societal diversity can break down the trust which is sought after in a stable democracy [Putnam, 2007]. Social 
inequality, especially in the form of income inequality, can also accelerate distrust within society [Wilkinson 
and Pickett, 2009] and it has been hinted that this connection may be more robust in the case of European states 
[Delhey and Dragolov, 2013]. Diversity and inequality disrupt the perceived values of equality among the 
members of a given society. If a society’s cohesiveness is built upon equality or the promise of equality, 
perceptions of largescale difference among the population can stress the system if there are no salient cross-
cutting identities to mitigate the stress. Separately, and in concert with one another, these factors shape the 
potential relationships between the peoples of a nation-state by influencing who can be considered within the 
discursively constructed “us”. Examining these societal influences on trust are of immense importance, 
especially in the midst of a crisis when social solidarity and governmental trust are certainly put to the test.  
While significant research has been done on the relationships between trust and equality and trust and diversity, 
no studies have taken this research further to determine what role these relationships play in the everyday 
salience of nationalism. By the term nationalism, I refer to “a way of talking, writing, and thinking about the 
basic units of culture, politics, and belonging that helps to constitute nations as real and powerful dimensions 
of social life” [Calhoun, 2007]. Furthermore, I focus on the ways that nationhood is enacted in the speech, 
actions, choices and consumption patterns of everyday individuals [Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008]. Everyday 
nationhood, which echoes the call from Michael Billig to notice the unconscious and banal uses of the nation 
in speech and symbols [Billig, 1995], helps to describe the discursive and practical possibilities for using the 
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nation as a salient form of difference-making. An additional important dimension of the research plan of 
everyday nationhood, is that it locates the transmission and growth of the national frame not within the 
discourse of ruling elites, but in the practical language and behaviors of everyday individuals. In this study, the 
behaviors of everyday individuals are present in the form respondents’ choices and their reliance on the national 
frame. Several questions in the survey focus exactly on those types of everyday discourses and understandings. 
Important to note is that the project focuses on individuals’ perceptions of trustworthiness, fairness and equality 
within their home societies and not on actual measurements. To help give a more complete picture, I 
incorporate survey questions that measure perceived levels of trust within society, when it comes to local, 
regional and national institutions. I anticipate that the levels of institutional trust within society will have some 
sort of correlation with the prevalence of nation-thinking. Albertazzi and McDonnell [2008] point to distrust 
in ruling elites as a prerequisite for the growth in nationalist claims which can accompany populism. This does 
not mean that distrust in democratic institutions necessarily precedes, accompanies or follows growing 
nationalism, but rather distrust in those who hold office in these public institutions has a correlation to growing 
nationalism. In order to better understand the relationship between societal trust and trust in institutions, as 
well as to control for this significant variable, institutional perceptions will be included in this survey on trust 
and nation-thinking. 
Analyzing trust or distrust is of paramount importance in assessing national cohesiveness and therefore national 
security issues. One Eurobarometer survey of Europeans’ attitudes towards security [Special Eurobarometer 
464b, 2017] looks at Europeans’ feeling of safety and security in the home community, in their country and in 
the EU, but it focuses on external threats and internal criminal threats. It does not consider the level of distrust 
within a society as a significant threat. Another Eurobarometer survey from 2017, Designing Europe’s Future 
(461), takes trust in institutions as a major subtopic of inquiry. Roughly following the results of this inquiry, I 
have chosen two countries that exhibit a pattern of trust in national governments and institutions (Norway and 
Sweden) and two countries that exhibit a pattern of distrust in national institutions and governments (Slovakia 
and Czechia).  
The Eurobarometer surveys suggest that those in an economically precarious position are less trustful of 
national governments than those who are economically stable. Additionally, generally speaking, those with 
lower levels of education are more distrustful than those who have attained higher levels of education. But how 
does this affect the level of nationalism within a society? Research suggests that European nationalist 
movements often find most recruits in the lower or working classes. However, in Scandinavia, nationalist 
movements more often recruit from the middle classes. Economic marginalization alone does not explain this 
relationship. Therefore, looking towards perceptions of fairness, equality and diversity in connection with trust 
can give us a more detailed look at these domestic processes that strengthen national salience.  
Trust is the most significant and repeated concept in the survey campaign. I ask about trust in three different 
ways: one, by directly asking about the levels of trust a respondent feels toward certain groups; two, by asking 
about what groups an individual feels they can count on; and three, by asking about the degree of respondents’ 
personal connection to various groups, as trust is closely related to the attachments an individual may feel. 
These three pathways toward measuring trust reflect different ways of conceptualizing what trust means. Trust 
is abstract, so including these different conceptualization helps us to get a better overall picture of trust. 
 TANULMÁNYOK 64 
Perhaps more importantly, trust is not only abstract, but highly contextual. This requires an examination of the 
“when” of trust, or rather, how trust is contextual or conditional. One may say, “I trust my brother if I get into 
a physical confrontation, but I don’t trust him with my stock portfolio.” Instead of determining if individuals 
trust, for example, the government in general; I set out to determine in what contexts individuals may trust the 
government, i.e. trust to maintain order and deliver essential services, but not to direct the public life of citizens. 
This understanding of trust relates closely to questions regarding the dividing line between public and private. 
In democratic societies, we could also conceptualize the right-left political spectrum as a sliding scale for how 
many spheres of influence in which we trust the state to operate. Of course, there are notable exceptions when 
it comes to political issues conceived as religious or moral issues. 
In the survey, I ask individuals directly about trust in ethnic co-nationals; however, I also gave respondents the 
space to reframe the distinctions of otherness and solidarity in their countries. In addition, in survey questions, 
I have distinguished between ethnic co-nationals and citizens. I have not asked directly about non-citizen 
residents. In this particular survey, it was more important to look at the phenomenon that Putnam describes as 
“hunkering down”; in other words, not necessarily who people do not trust, but simply if they do trust or not. 
Ideally, I want to capture the level of trust felt across different groups of people within society and not against 
specific groups. 
National attachments and supranational attachments do not have a zero-sum relationship. Contrary to messages 
from many politicians, it doesn’t have to be an “either/or” situation. Research from Castano [2004] and 
Duchesne and Frognier [2008], looking at local, regional, national and supranational identity, demonstrates 
that high- or low-level attachments to one level does not preclude high- or low-level attachments to another 
level. However, it hints at two things: (1) since many European political conflicts are currently constructed 
around an axis that pits national against supranational, there can be large impediments to establishing high 
levels of attachment to both levels at the same time, and (2) in general, adjacent levels can often feature 
complications like competition over who has decision-making competencies (i.e. independence movements, 
as an extreme example). High local and high national attachments, high regional and high supranational 
attachments; these types of formulations can be easier to maintain that adjacent levels like high national and 
high supranational attachments. In these relationships, we see examples of nesting identities, conflicting 
identities, “concordant” identities (Deutsch 2006: 166), as well as others. 
 
The Survey 
While the greater research project utilizes a mix of methods in its data collection, here I will focus mainly on 
the survey data. The survey questions ask respondents about their trust and attachment to various groups and 
institutions in the context of the pandemic. The questions garner numerical responses as well as user-generated 
text-based responses. These text-based responses allow respondents to define, in essence, their understanding 
of the concepts that feature most heavily in the survey, thereby demonstrating the ways in which the 
respondents understand, reproduce, challenge or even redefine the dominant understandings of trustworthiness, 
equality/inequality and homogeneity/diversity. While respondents are given an opportunity to essentially 
define how they understand some of the major concepts featured in this survey, they have not been given the 
opportunity to define the social groupings that they find most salient. They are asked to respond about the trust 
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they hold towards named social groupings or the attachment they feel towards them. This of course influences 
the individuals surveyed.  
The survey is 33 questions in length. Twenty-nine of the questions use an 11-point linear numeric scale (0–10) 
with a number of the questions grouped in multiple rating matrices, three questions collect user-generated text-
based responses of up to one sentence in length, and one question uses a modified 7-point Likert scale. The 
questions in the survey are suited specifically to the four countries in focus. In addition, I have asked 
respondents to provide some additional information about themselves at the conclusion of the survey. The 
survey does not collect any personal information about the respondents other than from four voluntary 
questions at the end of the survey. These questions ask how old the respondents are, where they get their news, 
what party they voted for in the last election and if they participate in any membership organizations. 
Respondents range in age from 18 years-old to 77 years-old, with the majority of respondents in their 30s, 40s 
and 50s. In all four countries, political views and worldviews are strongly linked to the choice of media 
consumed and the surveys yielded a good distribution of preferred news sources. 
The number of respondents for these online surveys was unfortunately rather small, though the amount of data 
generated was still rather large. This survey was shared primarily on Facebook so as to collect a greater age 
range than might be met through other social media platforms. The surveys were posted online in the end of 
May 2020 and were open for one month, which yielded just over 30 respondents each for Slovakia, Czechia 
and Norway. For Sweden, there were even fewer.  
 
Forms of political trust: governmental trust and institutional trust 
In my approach to the creating this survey, I wanted to add further nuance to the idea of societal trust. First, I 
separate societal trust in political and social trust. Next, I divide political trust into two separate spheres: 
governmental and institutional. I divide social trust into two overlapping spheres: generalized social trust (i.e. 
trust in strangers) and national trust (i.e. trust in your national community). In other words, at both the political 
level and the general social level, I ask respondents to evaluate both a what and a who. Governmental trust 
refers to those elected officials who are currently in power in a given country – a who. Institutional trust refers 
to the established state agencies and bureaucracies that are a bit less dynamic in nature – a what. Similarly, 
generalized social trust refers to individuals or strangers in society – a who – while national trust refers to a 
community of individuals – a what.  
 
Governmental trust 
When asked if respondents trust the current government in each respective country, the general level of 
governmental trust varied greatly. In Norway, nearly 70% of respondents stated that they either fully or 
partially trust the government and a very low percentage of respondents stated that they did not trust the 
government: 6.2% saying that they do not trust the government and 15.6% saying that they usually trust the 
government but not this particular government. In Slovakia, the majority of respondents were more lukewarm 
in their response. Over 60% of respondents stated that they either trusted the government very little or only 
somewhat. A significant number of respondents gave a conditional response: around 14% stated that they 
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usually do not trust the government but they trust the current government and around 17% stated that they 
usually trust the government but they do not trust the current government. In Czechia, the responses were 
divided across the trust spectrum with a higher percentage demonstrating low levels of trust in the government: 
56% stated that they either did not trust the government or they trusted them very little. In Sweden, all of the 
few respondents espoused high levels of trust for the government. 
In general, the survey responses seem to indicate a rather high level of governmental trust in Norway. This is 
especially interesting given the fact that the government in power at the time of this survey was a rightwing 
government and only 13% of the respondents stated that they voted for one of the parties in the ruling coalition 
during the previous election. These results emphasize the high level of governmental trust in the country. 
However, when asked if they trust the current government to properly handle the COVID-19 situation, 
respondents returned a trust score average of 6.45 out of 10 (σ 2.39). The corresponding result for Slovakia 
was a trust score average of 5.07 (σ 2.35), while the trust score average for Czechia was even lower at 4.58 (σ 
3.10). While not statistically relevant due to the low number of responses, the average trust score for Sweden 
was 6.75 (σ2.17). In general, the results for governmental trust in each of the four countries aligns with the 
expected results: rather high levels of governmental trust in the Scandinavian countries and markedly lower 
levels of governmental trust in the Central European countries. However, examining governmental trust alone 
does not give a complete picture of political trust in a country. 
 
Institutional trust 
The surveys do not only capture governmental trust; they also capture institutional trust. In one question that 
asks if state institutions can be trusted to deliver important services, the Norwegian respondents return a trust 
score much higher than that given to the government, 7.45 (σ 2.15). Respondents in Slovakia also returned a 
much higher institutional trust score than governmental trust score, 6.45 (σ 2.25). Respondents in Czechia 
returned, comparatively speaking, an even higher institutional trust score, 6.53 (σ 2.86), considering the 
governmental trust score was even lower than in Slovakia. Respondents in Sweden all gave high trust scores 
to institutions in the country. 
Institutional trust appears to be quite high in all four countries in question. In Sweden and Norway, over 75% 
of respondents gave scores of 7 or higher when asked how much they trust state institutions to deliver essential 
services. The majority of respondents from Slovakia and Czechia gave scores of 7 or higher as well, though 
there were a significant number of very low scores as well. Numbers that reflect institutional trust tell an 
important story. High institutional trust in Scandinavia is not unexpected, but it is underreported in Central 
Europe. Despite the fact that Slovakia and Czechia exhibit low levels of governmental trust and relatively low 
levels of generalized social trust, there are nevertheless stores of accumulated trust in society, and state 
institutions are the recipients of this trust.  
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I also asked about trust in institutions outside of the state, one supranational institution (the European Union) 
and two international (the World Health Organization and the United Nations). Respondents from Slovakia 
were the only group to report a high level of trust to the EU, with nearly 60% of responses at 7 or higher. In 
the case of the Czech Republic, 50% of the respondents gave the EU a score of 3 or lower. The average scores 
from Czech Republic, Sweden and Norway were all between 5 and 6, but the high standard deviations show 
that there was a high level of disagreement about the answers to these questions. Slovakia was the only country 
from which the average response was above 6. It should be noted that Norway is the only country that is not a 
member of the European Union. 
Respondents from Slovakia and the Czech Republic exhibited even lower levels of trust for the World Health 
Organization, markedly lower in the Slovakia and only somewhat lower in Czechia. Unsurprisingly, the WHO 
scored much higher in Norway than did the European Union. 
Czechia’s average score for trust given to the UN was just above 4, due to 18% of the respondents giving a 
zero score to the UN. For Slovakia, the average score was nearly 6 out of 10. The majority of scores from 
Norway were above 7; however, 15% of the respondents gave a zero score to trust in the UN. The limited data 
from Sweden shows a similar trend. Overall, the responses show a clear pattern of huge divisions within society 
regarded the perception of supranational and international institutions. In other words, these institutions 
received a number of very high and very low scores (evidenced by the high standard deviations), demonstrating 
that there is a significant amount of polarization in these countries when it comes to perceptions of international 
organizations. In none of the countries measured did any domestic institutions receive such low scores or such 
dramatic splits in the scores given. Only when it comes to the trustworthiness of politicians did respondents 
also give some zero scores as well. Predominantly, domestic institutions, received 1) generally higher scores 
than international institutions and 2) generally more clustered scores with fewer large splits in the scores given. 
So, regardless of respondents’ perceptions of international institutions, they gave relatively similar scores for 
domestic institutions. Therefore, institutional trust seems to be high in each of the four countries in question. 
This does not necessarily mean that all state institutions are evaluated equally. Respondents were asked only 
to give their perception of state institutions in general, not specific institutions.  
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Forms of Social trust: Generalized social trust & national trust 
The surveys also looked at generalized social trust, i.e. trust in strangers. I added a national component as well, 
asking both about other people living in the country and other people who shared the same national 
identity/ethnicity. In all four countries in question, the level of trust exhibited by the respondents is roughly the 
same for stranger co-residents and stranger co-nationals. This was not a huge surprise as both of these 
conceptualizations can be construed to represent the national “us”, especially in the case of Norway and 
Sweden. However, it was important to plant this nationally framed differentiation early in the survey, as many 
of the later questions try to determine what in-group holds the most salience for the respondents and what are 
the limits of the trust given to relevant in-groups. In Norway and Sweden, asking about ethnicity/national 
identity and preferences could be perceived as awkward. This is further complicated by the fact that there exist 
markedly different understandings within these countries regarding who is considered to be a member of the 
nation and who is kept out of the national community. Interpreting national identity as ethnicity has a strong 
history in all four countries in question, but the past decades have seen challenges to that dominant 
understanding in Scandinavia. There are significant segments of the population in both Sweden and Norway 
that interpret national identity in terms of citizenship and culture, as opposed to ethnicity or race. Ethnicity and 
race are still key components of national identity in these countries, but they are not often made explicit. In the 
Czech Republic, questions regarding national identity are also considered to be a bit awkward, but for a 
different reason. Due to a variety of historical circumstances, there today exists a relatively low level of 
attachment to national identity throughout the Czech Republic. As a multi-ethnic state, national differentiation 
has become engrained in the social and political life of Slovakia, so these questions would not be considered 
as awkward among survey respondents. Some of these interpretations were echoed by some colleagues who 
edited the language on the surveys or offered feedback on the questions. Colleagues in Sweden and Czechia 
responded that they thought respondents might be uncomfortable with (or at very least unaccustomed to) 
answering questions that took ethnicity into consideration and made it explicit.  
 
Reliance as trust 
In order to gain a fuller picture of respondents’ trust, the survey asks them not only to declare their trust in a 
variety of groups and institutions, but to rate the degree to which they feel they can rely on various groups. I 
include this additional dimension of trust for a variety of reasons. First, trust as a concept may not be easily 
defined and different respondents will likely have slightly differing understandings of what it means to trust; 
therefore, I wanted to include differing dimensions of what trust might mean. Second, trust, especially in its 
verb form, translates slightly differently in the four languages used for the survey. These linguistic differences, 
even when subtle, can have an effect on how trust is conceptualized; therefore, the more ways to access 
respondents’ levels of trust, the more detailed the picture that emerges.  
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Table 2 shows the degree to which respondents feel they can rely upon certain groups and institutions. While 
the data from Sweden is not statistically relevant, the general picture shows very high reliance on neighbors 
and quite high reliance on government and people. On the whole, the data is marked by generally high levels 
of confidence that people can rely on others in society in the Scandinavian countries. For all four countries, 
respondents give the highest reliability rating to their neighbors. Also of relevance is the low degree to which 
people feel they can rely on the state government, especially in the cases of Slovakia and Czechia. In contrast, 
the surveys from Norway, Slovakia and Czechia rated the reliability of local government significantly higher 
than that of state government.  
The low standard deviations (under σ2.00) found among the responses from Norway indicate a great deal of 
consensus when it comes to trusting neighbors, co-nationals and others regardless of nationality or ethnicity. 
The low standard deviations found among the response from Slovakia indicate a great deal of consensus when 
it comes to trusting local government, co-nationals and others regardless of nationality or ethnicity. The higher 
standard deviations among the responses from the Czech Republic indicate a greater degree of volatility or 
disagreement regarding the degree upon which these groups and institutions can be relied. 
The surveys from Slovakia show one other extremely interesting trend: that co-nationals receive a lower 
reliability score (5.57) than others in society regardless of their ethnicity or nationality (5.90). The low standard 
deviations demonstrate that there is a rather strong degree of consensus around these estimations, and this 
assessment is repeated in the answers to other survey questions. One possible explanation for this can be 
connected to the way in which Slovak society is ordered. It is the only country of the four that can be labeled 
a multi-ethnic state. Certainly, Sweden and Norway can be described as multicultural in nature primarily, 
though not completely, due to relatively recent immigration. In Slovakia, ethnicity is part of political life and 
part of many people’s social lives, depending on where they live in the country. Ethnicity as a fundamental 
building block of society, therefore, becomes a part of the dominant discourse. Perhaps because it is perceived 
as an everyday reality, nationality has taken on a different connotation. In the other countries in question, the 
topic of ethnicity is often shied away from in polite conversation, yet feelings of ethnic superiority (or 
skepticism towards other ethnicized groups) is rather widespread throughout the general population. This 
seems to match with the slightly lower reliability scores for ‘others regardless of ethnicity or nationality’ that 
we see in Norway and Czechia (as well as in the limited data from Sweden). It is not my assertion that more 
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publicly present discourse on nationality and ethnicity brings higher estimations of ethnic “others”. There are 
a number of episodes in Slovak social and political life over the past decade or so that have served to partially 
delegitimize nationalist parties and movements in the country. Survey respondents can also be reacting to this 
de-legitimization of the national frame. Also, due to the small sample size, these numbers cannot be seen as 
representative of the country as a whole; however, they do show a number of the possible interpretations of 
government and society that exist in the country.  
 
Social trust in the pandemic: a reliance on national stereotypes? 
One set of questions in the survey directly relates to the COVID situation: I ask respondents to give their 
perceptions of the degree to which people can be trusted to follow guidelines and act in solidarity with others. 
Specifically, I ask respondents to rate the degree to which they could trust people in their neighborhood and 
the degree to which they could trust people living in neighboring countries, though I did not specify which 
countries. This is the only time in the survey when respondents are asked about groups living outside of their 
country of residence. Partially influenced by anthropologist Marianne Gullestad, I focus on neighborhood as 
opposed to asking about one’s entire country. Gullestad finds that the way that individuals perceive their 
country can be highly influenced by the ways in which they experience their neighborhood [2006]. This does 
not necessarily mean that individuals view the country in which they live as their neighborhood writ large, 
although that is sometimes the case. However, individuals often imagine their country based upon how they 
interpret their neighborhood. So, for the purposes of these survey questions, the neighborhood was an important 
focus. 
In Norway, respondents gave a 6.82 average out of 10 when asked if their neighbors could be trusted to follow 
guidelines and a 7.34 average when asked if they could rely on their neighbors to help one another if necessary. 
Respondents in Norway gave an average 6.52 when asked if people in neighboring countries could be trusted 
to follow guidelines and a 6.64 average when asked if people in neighboring countries would also help one 
another if necessary (see table below for complete list of average scores). As expected, the evaluation of 
imagined people outside of Norway brought a lower trust rating. 
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One important thing to note is that, in general, respondents seem give higher scores when talking about giving 
help than when evaluating whether or not people will follow government guidelines and directives. The 
respondents from Slovakia provide an interesting exception to this: they gave a slightly higher average trust 
rating to their neighbors in regard to following guidelines (7.21) than to helping one another (7.17). This same 
exception appears in their evaluation of people living in neighboring countries. This evaluation of neighbors 
seems to correspond with the prevalent self-perception of people in Slovakia as obedient. Obedience and 
agreeability are prominent self-assigned national stereotypes in the country (Graf & Hrebícková, 2011), and 
the fact that following guidelines receives a slightly higher score than offering assistance (and a comparatively 
high score in general) seems to support the prevalence of this self-understanding. I do not make any claims 
about the validity of this stereotype, only that this stereotype seems to have an effect on the dominant discourse. 
This national stereotype, however, does not necessarily support the ratings given to individuals in neighboring 
countries, where rule-following receives higher trust scores than helping others 
When it comes to the numbers from respondents in the Czech Republic, national stereotypes can also play a 
significant role. Czech self-stereotypes often reference high levels of individualism and cautiousness. I do not 
claim that these self-perceptions are responsible for the numbers presented from this survey, but rather that 
they can help offer a reading of these responses. Respondents from Czechia exhibit a large difference between 
perceptions of neighbors’ obedience versus willingness to help when necessary. Individualism and 
cautiousness, taken in tandem, can be represented by skepticism. One reading of the numbers that show 
respondents’ expectations that neighbors will follow guidelines (6.50) could be informed by a healthy dose of 
cautiousness or skepticism, while respondents’ expectations that neighbors would help if necessary (7.55) 
could reflect a lower level of cautiousness. The phrase “if necessary” in the question about helping others likely 
influences respondents to drop a bit of their skepticism. In other words, counting on one’s neighbors to help in 
case of an emergency is a distinctly different scenario than counting on one’s neighbors to do all the little 
things that the government is asking them to do. There is much greater immediacy when it comes to the former.  
These questions also ask respondents to distinguish between neighbors complying with the government and 
neighbors helping concrete people, their neighbors. If the national self-stereotype of individualism is influential 
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to respondents, it would be likely for them to give a lower score of trust for neighbors following along with 
guidelines issued by the government, as the respondents themselves might feel a bit of skepticism to dictates 
from the government. Respondents from the Czech Republic exhibited extremely low trust scores when it 
comes to the degree to which they feel that they can rely on the state government (see earlier section on 
Reliance).       
In Norway, the fact that helping others scores higher than following guidelines seems to match with commonly 
held perceptions of Norwegian society, especially in regard to the concept of dugnad. “Dugnad refers to unpaid, 
collective, cooperative work where every member of a community is expected to participate regardless of their 
social position [Eriksen, 2020].” It is a ubiquitous concept in the Norwegian context, one that has been woven 
into the national character. Dugnad can take many forms from fixing up a community garden to the collective 
rebuilding effort after World War II. This idea of voluntarily helping others is engrained into the national 
consciousness so much so that it can hardly be called voluntary; it is expected. It is hardly surprising, then, that 
the expectations that neighbors will help one another are so high.    
The measurements for Sweden were not statistically relevant, but showed a moderately high level of trust for 
both neighbors and those living in neighboring countries, roughly similar to that of Norway. These results are 
more-or-less in line with what would be expected. In both Sweden and Norway, there exist general perceptions 
of solidarity being highly valued in society, though there are certainly significant challenges to this perception 
as well. Also, Sweden and Norway are each other’s most relevant other, along with Denmark, so it’s likely that 
many respondents are imagining the other country. The responses to this set of survey questions highlight two 
important factors of social trust: that the term trust contains within it different meanings and that trust, however 
conceptualized, is contextual (in other words, exemplifying the when of trust).  
 
Trust and the National Frame 
In this section, I will analyze the survey data especially in reference to questions which evoke the national 
frame. The two most relevant questions in that sense are the ones that ask respondents about the extent to which 
they trust other members of their own nation and the degree to which they feel they can rely upon members of 
their own nation. First, let us take a look at the trust scores given to residents of one’s own country versus 
members of one’s own nation (a formulation of generalized social trust and a formulation of national trust, 
respectively). 
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In Table 4, above, notice the nearly identical trust scores given for others residents of one’s country and other 
members of one’s nation. In other words, generalized social trust and national trust appear to be roughly the 
same in each country except for Slovakia, where fellow co-nationals (strangers that share a group identification 
with the respondent) garner a lower trust rating than fellow residents (strangers that share a home country). 
The standard deviations indicate a rather high amount of consensus on these trust assessments for each of the 
countries represented.  This does not necessarily mean that the national frame is not salient for many of the 
respondents, though it could also mean that. All that can be reliably said is that respondents have evaluated 
them nearly identically.  
Unfortunately, the 11-point numeric scale questions on the survey cannot accurately measure the salience of 
the nation or national frame, but it can offer some clues. The somewhat pessimistic view of one’s own nation, 
as shown in the responses from Slovakia, indicates a possibly diminishing salience of the national frame in the 
country, a de-legitimization of the national frame or an increasingly negative evaluation of the nation as an 
important social group. Simultaneously, we see a higher than average trust rating for the EU and high levels of 
European attachment. When looking at these clues, it is important to note that higher levels of national trust 
indicate higher entitativity, or the perception of the nation as really existing and not only abstract. The opposite 
cannot be said to be true: higher entitativity of the nation does not necessarily mean higher levels of national 
trust.  
High European entitativity does not necessarily mean low national entitativity, as it is not a zero-sum game 
between the levels of attachment; however, given current political divisions in Europe, there is often a negative 
correlation between the two attachments. Since the data from the Slovakia surveys also shows high levels of 
trust for neighbors, rather high levels of trust and attachments to the local, as well as rather high levels of trust 
given to strangers in neighboring countries, this supports the idea that, among the respondents from Slovakia, 
ideas about their own nation and the salience of nationality are being challenged in some way. 
In looking at the countries with nearly identical resident and co-national trust scores, there are some other 
significant points to mention. Respondents typically gave higher trust scores than reliance scores to both co-
nationals and residents without designated nationality or ethnicity. This demonstrates that respondents likely 
interpret “trust” and “reliability” in different ways, despite the fact that relying on someone is one possible way 
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of conceptualizing trust. This underlines the importance of asking about trust in multiple ways in order to 
capture respondents’ diverse understandings of the concept. Also, like the trust scores shown earlier, reliance 
scores for co-nationals and others regardless of their nationality/ethnicity were nearly identical, except for the 
responses from Slovakia, where respondents gave lower reliance scores to their co-nationals. 
One possible explanation for the typically flat scores for the categories ‘residents’ and ‘co-nationals’ can be 
found in societal norms regarding comfortableness or uncomfortableness of explicitly using the national frame, 
as mentioned earlier. Because of this uncomfortableness, respondents might not be willing to give drastically 
different answers for residents and co-nationals. It could also be that many respondents do not find those 
categories salient. In Slovakia, however, questions regarding nationality/ethnicity have been normalized to a 
certain degree. Since even before Slovak independence in 1993, national framing and national designations 
have been commonplace throughout society. Due to these engrained discourses and practices, taboos are 
largely absent from referencing ethnicity. This could be responsible for additional engagement with nationality-
based questions.     
 
The questions represented in Table 5 connect back to the ideas of populism and nationalism that are discussed 
briefly in the beginning of the paper. Albertazzi and McDonnell [2008] point to distrust in the ruling elite as 
one of the major prerequisites for the growing nationalist claims which often accompany populism. The type 
of nationalism referred to in Albertazzi and McDonnell’s work can be conceptualized as not just a salience of 
the national frame, but an overemphasis on the national frame; something akin to Michael Billig’s term “hot 
nationalism”. The two questions presented here elicit responses that indicate the degree of danger that exists 
for populist movements to take hold in the countries in question. High scores on both questions would indicate 
a low level of danger for the rise of populist movements in the countries. Low trust scores only for elected 
officials and not for scientists, economists and prominent advisors signals some danger for populist movements 
to grow among some segments of the population, but widespread conspiracy thinking does not seem to be 
present. Low trust scores on both questions would indicate widespread distrust of public elites and signal a 
high likelihood of widespread conspiracy thinking. In other words, this would demonstrate low political trust 
spilling into other spheres of public life. 
When it comes to trust in elected officials, Norway, Slovakia and Czechia exhibit moderate trust, moderately 
low trust and low trust, respectively. Especially of relevance are the high standard deviations for the trust 
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scores, specifically for Norway and Czechia. The standard deviations demonstrate a high degree of 
disagreement among respondents. Since the average trust scores for elected officials are not very high in 
general, this indicates that a significant number of respondents give extremely low trust scores to elected 
officials, most notably the over 30% of respondents from Czechia who give elected officials a trust score of 
zero or one. This trend supports the development or presence of populist movements within the countries 
among certain segments of the population, though not widespread; however, since the trust scores for scientists, 
economists and prominent advisors are quite high in all of the countries (and since institutional trust remains 
high in all these countries, as shown earlier), this does not indicate widespread conspiracy thinking in the four 
countries. The trust scores from Slovakia also demonstrate a great deal of strength in society and institutions, 
or perhaps more accurately the ability to bend and not completely break. After numerous political scandals 
throughout the 2010s, one could easily expect the trust scores for elected officials to be even lower than in the 
Czech Republic.  Nevertheless, the trust scores for elected officials are only moderately low and the trust scores 




Here, I will point to a couple of my initial conclusions from the average trust, reliability and attachment scores. 
First, the high levels of attachment declared for one’s country should be mentioned. This seems to be true 
across the board, regardless of the levels of political trust or social trust. Respondents also report generally 
high levels of attachment to Europe as well, except in the case of Czechia, where the assessments of attachment 
to country and Europe are nearly the same. Because of these strong attachments, we can reliably state that 
attachment to or identification with one’s country – one form of national identity – is one of the most dominant 
identifications, despite the fact that the survey data does not demonstrate high degrees of national trust between 
individuals. We could reasonably assume that groups and institutions most closely connected with one’s 
country have the potential to be the greatest aggregators of trust. However, we rarely see that possibility 
materialize. Usually only in international sporting events, like the Olympics or the World Cup, do we witness 
this type of phenomenon. If anything, this survey shows that our neighbors are often the greatest recipient of 
our trust, especially when respondents are thinking about who they trust most in the midst of a crisis.  
Second, despite strong connections to one’s country (and expectations that fellow countrymen follow rules 
better and are more willing to help others if necessary), on average, respondents did not give higher trust scores 
to their co-nationals. These rating were generally the same, or worse in the case of Slovakia, than the trust 
scores for residents of their country regardless of nationality/ethnicity. However, when it comes to reliability, 
respondents on average gave their co-nationals a slightly higher rating, except in the case of Slovakia. This 
indicates that nationality/ethnicity plays some role in processes of differentiation and evaluation (in terms of 
trust) even when respondents say that they do not evaluate national groupings differently (by giving identical 
or nearly identical trust scores). 
Third, local governments receive rather high reliability ratings, certainly higher than the reliability ratings 
received by state governments. Local government reliability rating is interesting for a few reasons. Results 
show that, in general, neighbors score high; however, local attachment is not that high, so it is not local 
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patriotism that primarily drives these scores. Generally speaking, respondents assessed the people living in 
their neighborhood, town and region to share greater similarity than people living throughout the country. 
Perhaps perceptions of sameness account in some small way for greater faith in local government. It could 
simply be that the idea of local government is valued in each of the countries. In certainly is in Norway, where 
a strong case can be made for decentralization having a major impact on the high institutional and governmental 
trust. Episodes of centralization have created major backlashes in Norwegian society, like the recent 
consolidation of municipalities and counties throughout the country. It is especially unfortunate that there are 
not enough survey results from Sweden, a country which has seen largescale centralization processes. Taken 
together, results from these two countries could be very telling. However, regardless of what causes this 
phenomenon, could reinvigorating and empowering the local be the key to restoring trust in public spheres 
where it is in decline? Survey results indicate that there are significant amounts of accumulated trust in local 
government.  
Across the responses from all four countries, proximity seems to be an influential factor. Neighbors and local 
governments received the highest trust scores, regardless of how high or low the generalized social trust scores 
and political trust scores were. In addition, institutional trust seems to be high overall, which could signal a 
higher degree of trust in institutions than people. Interestingly, in line with the question of proximity, the 
Scandinavian countries are known for having prominent perceptions that there is small distance between 
everyday citizens and those in power, and in the case of Norway, decentralization means that state institutions 
often have local offices and faces, another factor that could partially explain the exceptionally high level of 
trust for institutions in Norway (and Sweden).  
Fourth, while only alluded to in the data presented here, respondents in Slovakia and Czechia perceive a high 
degree of income inequality in their countries despite the fact that both countries score well on the GINI index. 
Inequality in society is often an influential feature in how people view strangers and should yield some 
significant effect on generalized social trust (i.e. trust in strangers). If actual inequality were the driver, it would 
be more likely to see higher generalized social trust because, according to GINI coefficients, income inequality 
is low in both Slovakia and Czechia. If perceived inequality were more influential, it would be more likely to 
see a dip in the level of generalized social trust, which seems to be the case in these survey results. While there 
are numerous other variables to consider, perceptions of inequality seem to be at least one of the significant 
influences on social trust, more so than objective inequality.   
Lastly, while respondents seem to differentiate along national lines in their trust responses, the degree of 
difference does not appear statistically relevant in this small sample size from the four countries in question. 
This signals that during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic, nationalism did not play a significant role 
in the formulations of societal trust for the four countries in question. However, the results also signal the 
degree to which the four countries in question are prepared to buffer the negative social and political 
consequences of the pandemic. The lower levels of political trust and generalized social trust in Slovak and 
Czechia can lead to significant challenges and, as always, the national frame remains a dominant form of social 
differentiation that can be utilized in such challenges. Norway and Sweden seem better prepared to buffer 
negative and political consequences from the pandemic due to the higher levels of governmental, institutional 
and generalized social trust.   
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